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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Majid Kolestani, a.k.a. Nataran Kolestani, appeals from the judgment entered
upon the district court’s order summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction
relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In August 2008, Kolestani—a transgender woman who, along with her husband,
had come to the United States as a refugee from Iran—deliberately shot and killed her
husband, apparently after learning “he was leaving.” (R., pp.138, 142-43; 6/1/09 Tr.,
p.15, L.10 – p.18, L.1; 7/10/09 Tr., p.7, L.18 – p.8, L.1, p.14, L.3 – p.17, L.21. 1) The
state charged Kolestani with first-degree murder and a deadly weapon enhancement. (R.,
pp.250, 294.) Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Kolestani pled guilty to
first-degree murder, the state dismissed the enhancement, the parties stipulated to the
imposition of a unified life sentence with 18 years determinate, and Kolestani waived her
rights to appeal and to file a Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.250, 294.) The district court
accepted the agreement and, on July 10, 2009, imposed the agreed upon sentence. (R.,
pp.136, 294; see generally 7/10/09 Tr.) Kolestani did not appeal. (R., pp.136, 294.)
Almost six years later, on March 20, 2015, Kolestani filed a pro se petition for
post-conviction relief. (R., pp.17-47.) At Kolestani’s request, the district court appointed
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The district court took judicial notice of a number of documents from the underlying
criminal case, including the transcripts of Kolestani’s June 1, 2009, entry of plea and July
10, 2009, sentencing hearings. (See R., pp.248-89, 294 n.1.) Those transcripts are
included in the clerk’s record at pages 261-268 and pages 269-278, respectively.
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counsel (R., pp. 48-52, 62-63, 73-74), who thereafter filed an amended post-conviction
petition (R., pp.135-51). Relevant to this appeal, the amended petition alleged that (1)
Kolestani’s guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because
(a) she was ignorant of the immigration consequences of her plea, and (b) her trial
counsel advised her she would be immediately deported if she did not plead guilty
(hereinafter referred to as the “involuntary guilty plea claim”) (R., pp.141-43); and (2)
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by giving Kolestani “deeply erroneous”
advice regarding the deportation consequences she would face if she did not plead guilty
(hereafter referred to as the “erroneous deportation advice claim”) (R., pp.143-46). The
state answered the amended petition and moved for summary dismissal on the bases that
the petition was time-barred and otherwise failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
entitling Kolestani to an evidentiary hearing on any of her claims. (R., pp.174-87.)
After conducting a hearing and entertaining additional briefing (R., pp. 195-206,
228-29, 237-47, 290-92), the district court entered an order partially granting and partially
denying the state’s motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.293-318). The court recognized
that Kolestani failed to file her post-conviction petition within the one-year limitation
period of I.C. § 19-4902, but it denied the state’s motion to summarily dismiss the
petition as untimely, finding the allegations in the petition raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Kolestani was entitled to equitable tolling. (R., pp.298-304.)
The court then addressed the claims in the petition and found all but one of them,
including the involuntary guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice claims, lacking in
evidentiary support and/or disproved by the record. (R., pp.305-16.) The court therefore
granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal of those claims. (R., p.317.) The court
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deferred ruling on the remaining claim, noting it had granted the parties additional time to
submit evidence and argument concerning that claim. (R., p.317.) The court concluded
its order by indicating that “[i]f the court allowed Kolestani’s remaining claim to proceed
to trial, the question of the applicability of the statute of limitations, and any tolling
issues, [would] be determined at trial.” (R., p.317.)
After the court entered its order partially granting the state’s motion for summary
dismissal, Kolestani advised the court she no longer wished to pursue her sole remaining
claim. (R., pp.330-32, 380; 9/11/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.10-21.) “Based upon that,” the court
entered a final judgment dismissing Kolestani’s petition in its entirety. (R., pp.380-82;
9/11/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.23-24.)
Twelve days after the entry of judgment, Kolestani filed a motion for
reconsideration, asking the district court to revisit its summary dismissal decision in light
of information contained in a report prepared by an immigration attorney. (R., pp.38385.) The court had granted Kolestani’s request for appointment of the immigration
attorney early in the post-conviction proceedings (see R., pp.96-97, 107-09, 383) and,
according to post-conviction counsel, the immigration attorney had “submitted his
memorandum on the immigration consequences of this matter” (hereafter referred to as
“the immigration report”) to post-conviction counsel in December 2016 (R., p.383).
However, post-conviction counsel never presented the immigration report as evidence
during the summary dismissal proceedings and, as such, the district court did not review
or consider that report before it summarily dismissed Kolestani’s involuntary guilty plea
and erroneous deportation advice claims in May 2017. (R., p.383; see also 9/11/17 Tr.,
p.3, L.25 – p.6, L.1.) Kolestani included the immigration report as an exhibit to her
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motion for reconsideration (R., pp.386-426) and asked the district court, based on the
information in that report, to grant the motion and “allow this matter to move forward to
trial” (R., pp.383-85). The district court denied Kolestani’s motion for reconsideration 2
(R., pp.433-34), and Kolestani timely appealed (R., pp.439-41).

2

The state notes the district court judge who ruled on Kolestani’s motion for
reconsideration was not the same judge who had earlier presided over the post-conviction
proceedings and summarily dismissed Kolestani’s post-conviction claims. (Compare R.,
pp.293-317 (summary dismissal order entered by then-District Judge G. Richard Bevan
with R., pp.433-34 (order denying reconsideration entered by District Judge Ronald J.
Wilper).)
4

ISSUES
Kolestani states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Ms. Kolestani’s
coerced guilty plea claim, because she raised a genuine issue of
material fact on whether her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary?

II.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Ms. Kolestani’s
erroneous advice claim, because she raised a genuine issue of
material fact on whether trial counsel gave her deeply erroneous
advice on deportation consequences?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms.
Kolestani’s motion for reconsideration without comment, because
the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards or reach its decision by an exercise of reason?

(Appellant’s brief, p.11.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Kolestani failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing her
involuntary guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice claims because the allegations in
Kolestani’s petition failed to present a genuine issue of material fact entitling her to an
evidentiary hearing on either of those claims?
2.
Has Kolestani failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for reconsideration?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Kolestani Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Her
Involuntary Guilty Plea And Erroneous Deportation Advice Claims
A.

Introduction
Kolestani argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing her involuntary

guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice claims, contending the allegations in her
petition raised genuine issues of material fact entitling her to an evidentiary hearing on
both of those claims. (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-29.) Kolestani’s arguments fail. A
review of the record and of the applicable law supports the district court’s determination
that Kolestani’s claims were disproved by the record.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802;
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
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Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the
applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).

Until controverted by the state,

allegations in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545,
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the
applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in
favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court
is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted
evidence. Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 536, 348 P.3d 145, 151 (2015); Hayes v. State,
146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be
disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the
petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho
517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d
1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is
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appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor. For this
reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when
the state does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873
P.2d at 901.

D.

Kolestani Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
Her Involuntary Guilty Plea Claim
Kolestani alleged her guilty plea was involuntary, claiming both that she was

ignorant of the immigration consequences of her plea and that the plea was coerced
through fear because her trial counsel advised her she would be immediately deported if
she did not plead guilty.

(R., pp.141-43.)

The district court summarily dismissed

Kolestani’s involuntary guilty plea claim, finding the allegations upon which it was based
were “disproven by the record.” (R., pp.305-08.) Specifically, after reviewing the written
plea agreement, the guilty plea questionnaire, and the transcript of the hearing at which
Kolestani entered her guilty plea (R., pp.306-07), the district court concluded:
… Kolestani gave the trial court multiple assurances that her plea
was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, with the advice of
counsel. She now changes her testimony before this court, claiming she
was ignorant of the process and that [defense counsel] told her to plead
guilty or she would be deported. The record simply disproves these
claims. While Kolestani was in the throes of the hearing, having had
matters discussed with a local interpreter and her counsel, she affirmed
multiple times that she entered her plea without any coercion or threat, and
that she did so “voluntarily.” As such, the court concludes that the record
disproves Kolestani’s claims; she in fact entered her plea knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently.
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(R., pp.307-08 (footnote and record citations omitted)).

Contrary to Kolestani’s

assertions, a review of the record and of the applicable law supports the district court’s
ruling.
“The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant.” Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 481, 180 P.3d 511, 520 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004)). “For a guilty
plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered into in a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527, 164
P.3d 798, 807 (2007) (citing State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 1193, 1194
(2007)). Determining whether a plea is voluntary involves three inquiries: “(1) whether
the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the
charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the
consequences of pleading guilty.” Id. (citing State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d
626, 628 (1976)); accord State v. Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 507, 376 P.3d 707, 711
(2016).
Kolestani’s involuntary guilty plea claim was premised on her assertions that she
was ignorant of the immigration consequences of her plea and believed, based upon the
advice of counsel, that she would be immediately deported if she did not plead guilty. As
found by the district court, however, Kolestani’s allegations did not present a prima facie
claim that her guilty plea was involuntary because her claims of ignorance and coercion
are affirmatively disproved by the underlying criminal record.
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Before she pled guilty, Kolestani signed a written Rule 11 plea agreement in
which she specifically indicated that her “decision to accept th[e] agreement and to tender
a plea of guilty [was] freely and voluntarily made and [was] not the result of force,
threats, assurances, promises, or representations other than the representations contained”
in the agreement. (R., p.250.) She made similar representations in the guilty plea
advisory questionnaire, indicating that aside from the plea agreement, no other promises
had been made to her which influenced her decision to plead guilty (R., p.253, ¶16); she
was aware that, as a non-citizen, “the entry of a plea or making of factual admissions
could … result in [her] deportation” (R., pp.254-55, ¶30); she had sufficient time to
discuss the case with her attorney and was satisfied with her attorney’s representation (R.,
p.256, ¶¶43, 51); she was entering her plea “freely and voluntarily” because she
“commit[ted] the acts alleged in the … indictment” (R., p.257, ¶¶54-57); she needed no
additional time before entering her plea (R., p.257, ¶60); there was no “other matter not
covered by [her] answers” to the questions on the guilty plea advisory form “that
affect[ed] [her] decision to plead guilty” (R., p.258, ¶63); and she answered the questions
on the guilty plea advisory form “truthfully,” understood each question, and completed
the form “freely and voluntarily” and “no one ha[d] threatened her to do so” (R., p.258).
Kolestani also swore under oath at the change of plea hearing that she was
entering her plea voluntarily. (See generally 6/1/09 Tr.) During that hearing, Kolestani
confirmed her intent to plead guilty to first degree murder in exchange for the dismissal
of a weapons enhancement and the imposition of a life sentence, with a minimum term of
confinement of 18 years. (6/1/09 Tr., p.6, L.3 – p.10, L.4.) Although Kolestani did not
speak English, she had the assistance of a Farsi-speaking interpreter “throughout the
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case,” including at the change of plea hearing, and she told the court she had “been able
to understand the translation from English to Farsi as [she] worked with” the interpreter.
(6/1/09 Tr., p.3, Ls.18-22, p.11, Ls.20-23.) She also assured the court she understood that
no one, including her attorney, could force her to plead guilty to the charge. (6/1/09 Tr.,
p.12, Ls.15-19.) As she had in her guilty plea advisory form, Kolestani told the court she
was aware and understood there was a potential she would be deported “once [she] ha[d]
served time in the penitentiary.” (6/1/09 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.8.) She also confirmed
that all of the answers she had given to the questions on the guilty plea advisory form
were her own and that none of those answers would change if the court were to ask the
questions in open court. (6/1/09 Tr., p.13, L.16 – p.15, L.2.) She then pled guilty to the
first degree murder charge and told the court she was doing so because she shot her
husband with the intent to kill him and after having “thought about it prior to taking the
action.” (6/1/09 Tr., p.16, L.6 – p.18, L.1.) Finally, Kolestani assured the court that no
one had “pressured [her] or threatened [her] or coerced [her] in any way” and that she was
entering her plea of her own free will, after having been provided adequate time to
consult with her attorney about her decision. (6/1/09 Tr., p.18, Ls.2-18.)
Kolestani’s answers to the questions asked of her on the guilty plea questionnaire,
coupled with her representations during the plea colloquy, directly contradict her postconviction claims that her plea was involuntary. Although the district court was required
to accept Kolestani’s unrebutted allegations as true and to construe all inferences in her
favor, Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793-94, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112-13 (2004), it
was not required to accept as true Kolestani’s statements that contradicted the record in
the underlying criminal case. As found by the district court, “[w]hile Kolestani was in the
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throes of the [change of plea] hearing, having had matters discussed with a local
interpreter and her counsel, she affirmed multiple times that she entered her plea without
any coercion or threat, and that she did so ‘voluntarily.’” (R., pp.307-08 (record citation
and footnote omitted).)

Kolestani cannot show that her factual claims that merely

contradict the underlying record create a genuine issue of material fact entitling her to an
evidentiary hearing on her involuntary guilty plea claim.
Despite having assured the court in multiple ways and on multiple occasions
during the change of plea proceedings that her plea was voluntary and not the result of
coercion, Kolestani argues on appeal that the record of the change of plea proceedings
“did not actually disprove” her post-conviction claims. (Appellant’s brief, p.16.) In
support of this assertion, she points out that the plea agreement itself was “silent on
deportation consequences, much less on whether Ms. Kolestani would be immediately
deported if she did not plead guilty.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17 (citing R., p.250).)
While true, this fact is irrelevant because other portions of the underlying criminal record,
including the guilty plea advisory form and the transcript of the plea colloquy, show
Kolestani was aware she could be deported if she pled guilty. (See R., pp.254-55, ¶30;
6/1/09 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.8.)

She also expressly disavowed having been

“pressured” or “threatened” or “coerced” “in any way” to enter her plea and claimed to
have disclosed all matters that affected her decision to plead guilty. (6/1/09 Tr., p.18,
Ls.2-15; R., p.258, ¶63.) Although Kolestani correctly notes the trial court never asked
her “about her understanding of what would happen if she did not plead guilty”
(Appellant’s brief, p.17 (citing R., pp.261-68)), this fact is also irrelevant. Kolestani
alleged in her post-conviction that her guilty plea was coerced by the threat of immediate
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deportation, and that claim is directly disproven by Kolestani’s representations during the
change of plea hearing that her plea had not been coerced “in any way.” Kolestani has
failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order summarily dismissing
this claim.

E.

Kolestani Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
Her Erroneous Deportation Advice Claim
In addition to alleging her plea was involuntary, Kolestani also alleged in her post-

conviction petition that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by giving her
“deeply erroneous” advice regarding the deportation consequences of her plea. (R.,
pp.143-46.)

Specifically, Kolestani alleged that counsel advised her she would be

immediately deported if she did not accept the plea agreement, advice she claimed both
below and on appeal is patently incorrect. (R., pp.143-46; see also Appellant’s brief,
pp.20-21.) The district court summarily dismissed the claim, finding as it had with
respect to Kolestani’s involuntary guilty plea claim that the allegation counsel threatened
Kolestani with immediate deportation if she did not plead guilty was disproved by the
record and, as such, failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the deficient
performance prong of Kolestani’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.30912.) Contrary to Kolestani’s assertions, the record and the applicable law support the
district court’s ruling.
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774
P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do
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not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho
at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State,
110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d
1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App.
1999). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice in relation to a guilty plea,
“in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote
and citations omitted).
Applying these principles in this case, the district court found Kolestani failed to
present a prima facie case of deficient performance because the premise of her erroneous
deportation advice claim—that counsel advised Kolestani she would be immediately
deported if she did not plead guilty—was disproved by the record. Specifically, court
reasoned:
Once again, this court concludes that the record belies the
statements of fact set forth in Kolestani’s verified Amended Petition. As
noted above, Kolestani indicated when pleading guilty that she was acting
voluntarily, and without any coercion whatsoever. To claim now, some
eight years later, that she was acting under the provocation or coercion
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based on bad advice regarding her immigration status is simply not an
inference that this court is willing to make.
The reality is that the Indictment charging Kolestani with First
Degree Murder was filed on September 3, 2008 and that she pleaded guilty
some nine (9) months later. The court further makes the logical inference
from these facts that the plea agreement, a Rule 11 presented to the court
and negotiated over time, was not merely “sprung” on Kolestani on the
date of the change-of-plea hearing; rather, she had time to fill-out an
advisory form, to note that she had “read” the agreement (as it was
translated by Dr. Dabestani as noted earlier), and that she understood the
agreement. She further noted that a Farsi interpreter was provided to her
throughout the process.
The Advisory form was signed June 1, 2009, some eight days
before the change-of-plea hearing. It is further noteworthy that Kolestani
noted that no other promises had been made to her which influenced her
decision to plead guilty. The promise that she would be deported if she
did not plead guilty is certainly one that, were it entitled to weight by this
court, should have been noted on the form at that time.
The form also contains Kolestani’s acknowledgement that as a
non-citizen of the United States, her plea of guilty could “(1) result in [her]
deportation or removal from the United States; (2) preclude [her] from
obtaining legal status in the United States; or (3) prevent [her] from
obtaining United States citizenship.” Regarding this acknowledgement,
Kolestani had the following discussion with Judge Stoker during the
change-of-plea hearing:
THE COURT: You have told me, told the Court in
this form that you recognize the potential of deportation
from this country. Are you aware of that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: This Court has nothing to do with
the issue of deportation. I just want to make you aware,
because of your status, that that is a possibility once you
have served time in the penitentiary. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Based upon these undisputed facts in the record, the record
disproves Kolestani’s assertion that her counsel was deficient under
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Strickland by giving her gravely erroneous advice regarding deportation.
The court further makes the logical inference that, had [defense counsel]
erroneously told Kolestani that she would be deported if she did not plead
guilty, Kolestani would have brought that to the attention of the court in
the forms and/or during the colloquy wherein she had the opportunity to
do so. The claim as raised now is not supported by the record or this
court’s inferences; therefore, this claim is DISMISSED.
(R., pp.310-12 (footnote and record citations omitted).)
Kolestani challenges the district court’s ruling that she failed to present a prima
facie case of deficient performance on two bases. First, she contends that trial counsel
had an obligation under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), to correctly inform
Kolestani of the immigration consequences of her plea, and that “conduct by the
prosecution or the trial court to inform Ms. Kolestani of the immigration consequences
did not eliminate trial counsel’s obligation to inform her of the consequences.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-24 (citing, inter alia, Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69; Murray v.
State, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014).) The state agrees with these propositions,
generally, but neither of them shows the district court erred. The district court did not
dismiss Kolestani’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it found, regardless of
any representation by counsel, that Kolestani was aware of the actual deportation
consequences of her plea.

Rather, the court found the very premise of Kolestani’s

claim—that counsel told Kolestani she would be deported if she did not plead guilty—
was disproved by the record of the underlying criminal proceedings. (See R., pp.310-12.)
Kolestani’s attempt to show error by constructing a strawman basis for dismissal never
articulated by the district court should be rejected.
Kolestani next argues that, in finding her erroneous deportation advice claim
disproved by the record, the district court made inappropriate inferences and did not
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construe the facts in her favor. (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-26.) Specifically, Kolestani
faults the court for making the “‘logical inference that, had [trial counsel] erroneously
told Kolestani that she would be deported if she did not plead guilty, Kolestani would
have brought that to the attention of the court in the forms and/or during the colloquy
wherein she had the opportunity to do so.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.24 (quoting R., p.312).)
Kolestani acknowledges that, as the trier of fact, the district court was “‘not constrained
to draw inferences’” in her favor and was instead “‘free to arrive at the most probably
inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidentiary facts.’” (Appellant’s brief
(quoting Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 536, 348 P.3d 145, 151 (2015)) (emphasis in
Appellant’s brief).) She argues, however, that whether trial counsel advised her she
would be immediately deported if she did not plead guilty was a disputed evidentiary fact
and, as such, the court was required to accept her factual allegations at face value.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.24-26.) Kolestani’s argument fails.
Although the district court was not permitted at the summary dismissal stage of
the proceedings to weigh conflicting evidence, it was also not required to accept as true
any allegations in Kolestani’s post-conviction petition that were affirmatively disproved
by the record of the underlying criminal case. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522,
164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333-34, 971 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998).
And in this case, contrary to Kolestani’s assertions, there was no conflicting evidence for
the court to weigh. Kolestani alleged her trial counsel told her she would be immediately
deported if she did not plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. (R., pp.144-46.)
While the state disputed this allegation in the sense it denied it was true, the state did not
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submit for the court’s consideration any conflicting evidence. Instead, the state argued
the allegations in the petition were conclusory and disproved by the underlying criminal
record. (See R., pp.181-87, 237-47.) The district court ultimately agreed with the latter
proposition, finding that Kolestani’s post-conviction claim that she was told she would be
deported if she did not plead guilty was foreclosed by her assurances during the guilty
plea proceedings that “no other promises had been made to her which influenced her
decision to plead guilty.” (R., p.311.) That the court also made the “logical inference”
that Kolestani would have informed the trial court during the guilty plea proceedings that
defense counsel advised her she would be deported if she did not plead guilty had such
advice actually been given was not “inappropriate” under the applicable legal standards.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25.) Kolestani’s unqualified assurances during the guilty
plea proceedings that she had not been coerced, had disclosed all matters affecting her
decision to plead guilty, and had been made no other promises that affected her decision
to enter her plea, discussed in more detail in section I, supra, support the court’s inference
and affirmatively disprove Kolestani’s post-conviction claim that her counsel advised her
she would be subject to immediate deportation if she did not enter a guilty plea.
Because the underlying criminal record affirmatively disproves the allegation that
trial counsel advised Kolestani she would be immediately deported if she did not plead
guilty, Kolestani’s petition necessarily failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to either
the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of her erroneous deportation advice claim.
The district court’s order summarily dismissing that claim should therefore be affirmed.
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F.

If This Court Finds Kolestani’s Petition Presented A Genuine Issue A Material
Fact As To One Or Both Of Her Post-Conviction Claims, The Proper Remedy Is
Remand For An Evidentiary Hearing On Both The Statute Of Limitations Issue
And The Substantive Claim(s)
The state moved to summarily dismiss Kolestani’s post-conviction petition on the

bases that the petition was untimely and that the allegations therein otherwise failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling Kolestani to an evidentiary hearing on any
of her claims. (R., pp.178-87.) The district court agreed the petition was untimely but
declined to summarily dismiss the petition on that basis, finding the allegations in the
petition raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kolestani was entitled to
equitable tolling. (R., pp.298-304.) However, because the court ultimately dismissed the
claims in the petition on their merits, the court never conducted an evidentiary hearing on
the statute of limitations issue. For the reasons set forth above, the state submits the
district court correctly dismissed Kolestani’s involuntary guilty plea and erroneous
deportation advice claims.

However, in the event this Court disagrees and finds

Kolestani presented a genuine issue of material fact as to one or both of those claims, the
state submits the proper remedy is remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
on the statute of limitations issue, as well as on the substantive claim(s). See, e.g.,
Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 665, 603 P.2d 995, 999 (1979) (general reversal of a
judgment leaves the case “standing as it did” prior to the entry of the judgment).
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II.
Kolestani Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Of The District Court’s Order
Denying Her Motion For Reconsideration
A.

Introduction
After the district court entered its judgment finally dismissing Kolestani’s post-

conviction petition, Kolestani filed a “Motion to Reconsider,” asking the court to revisit
its summary dismissal order in light of an immigration report Kolestani attached to the
motion.

(R., pp.383-426.)

The district court denied Kolestani’s motion for

reconsideration without comment. (R., pp.433-34.)
Kolestani now argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion for reconsideration.

Specifically, she contends that the motion is properly

construed as one for relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) and that, by
denying the motion “without explaining why Ms. Kolestani’s case did not meet the
circumstances of Rule 60(b),” the court “did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards or reach its decision by an exercise of reason.” (Appellant’s brief, p.30.)
Assuming, without conceding, that the district court should have treated the motion as a
Rule 60(b)(1) motion, 3 any error arising from its failure to do so or to explain its reasons
for denying the motion is harmless because the allegations in the motion are insufficient,
as a matter of law, to entitle Kolestani to relief under the rule.

3

Whether a post-judgment motion should be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion or a Rule
60(b) motion is controlled by the substance of the motion. Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho
873, 879, 292 P.3d 264, 270 (2012); Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 706, 365 P.3d 1050,
1060 (Ct. App. 2015). Where the motion is filed within 14 days of the judgment and
seeks to correct legal or factual errors occurring before judgment it is properly considered
a Rule 59(e) motion. Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060. “Conversely, where a
motion presents new information or issues for the court to consider, treatment as a motion
for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) is most appropriate.” Id. (citations omitted).
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B.

Standard Of Review
A district court’s decision granting or denying an I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 914, 332
P.3d 815, 826 (2014). “[W]hen the discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an
error of law,” the appellate court’s role is ordinarily to “note the error and remand the
case for additional findings.” Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737, 228 P.3d 998, 1004
(2010). Remand is not required, however, if “there is an alternative ground for upholding
the district court’s decision.” Id.; accord Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 706, 365 P.3d
1050, 1060 (Ct. App. 2015).

Moreover, even when the trial court has abused its

discretion, such “abuse of discretion may be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not
affected.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); accord
I.R.C.P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and
defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”); Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 157
Idaho 966, ___, 342 P.3d 893, 900 n.4 (2015) (district court’s error, if any, in denying
Rule 60(b) motion on grounds it was untimely was harmless where, on its face, motion
was without merit).

C.

The Allegations In Kolestani’s Motion Are Insufficient, As A Matter Of Law, To
Entitle Her To Relief Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final

judgment or order for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the

21

judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
I.R.C.P. 60(b). “Although the district court has broad discretion in deciding a Rule 60(b)
motion, the motion may be granted only upon a showing of unique and compelling
circumstances.” Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1063 (2003) (citing
Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607, 610 (1996)). Moreover, the party
seeking relief must also “show, plead or present evidence of facts which, if established,
would constitute a meritorious defense to the action.” Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v.
Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663, 670 (Ct. App. 1994).
Kolestani moved for reconsideration based on an immigration report she
possessed, but did not submit to the district court, before the court entered its order
summarily dismissing her involuntary guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice
claims. (R., pp.383-426; see also 9/11/17 Tr., p.3, L.25 – p.6, L.1.) Although not
specifically labeled as such, Kolestani now claims her motion for reconsideration was “a
Rule 60(b)(1) motion brought on grounds of excusable neglect” because, according to
Kolestani, her post-conviction counsel reasonably believed at the time the court entered
its summary dismissal order that the immigration report was part of the record.
(Appellant’s brief, p.32.) Accepting Kolestani’s interpretation of the motion as one
brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), it was Kolestani’s burden to demonstrate in the
motion that her neglect in failing to submit the immigration report to the trial court before
it summarily dismissed her post-conviction claims was, in fact, excusable. See, e.g.,
Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708-09, 117 P.3d 120, 122-23 (2005). Kolestani failed to
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do so, however, and thus failed as a matter of law to show any entitlement to relief under
the rule.
In the motion for reconsideration, Kolestani’s attorney represented that the courtappointed immigration attorney had submitted his immigration report on December 13,
2016, almost five months before the district court entered its order summarily dismissing
Kolestani’s involuntary guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice claims. (R., p.383;
see also R., p.293 (summary dismissal order filed on May 25, 2017).)

Although

Kolestani’s attorney noted the district court’s summary dismissal decision was made
without the benefit of the immigration report, nowhere in the motion did counsel attempt
to explain why that was the case. (See generally R., pp.383-85.) As Kolestani points out
on appeal, counsel did explain to the district court at a hearing before judgment was
entered that he “thought that immigration report had become part of the court file” but,
“[u]pon review of the file, [he] realized that was [his] error” and the immigration report
“had only been sent to [post-conviction counsel] and the prosecution.” (9/11/17 Tr., p.4,
Ls.11-15.) Counsel did not make any similar representations in the motion to reconsider,
however, and thus failed in the motion to allege, much less demonstrate, that his failure to
timely submit the immigration report was the result of excusable neglect.
Even

if

this

Court

considers

post-conviction

counsel’s

pre-judgment

representation that he erroneously believed the immigration report was part of the court
file at the time the court entered its summary dismissal order, such representation falls far
short of demonstrating excusable neglect. When a party files a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for
relief from judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect, “[t]he conduct constituting
excusable neglect must be that which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person
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under the same circumstances.” Suitts, 141 Idaho at 709, 117 P.3d at 123, quoted in Berg
v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 577, 212 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2009). Post-conviction counsel’s
conduct in merely assuming the immigration report “had become part of the court file”
before the court ruled on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, when it was
Kolestani’s burden to present admissible evidence supporting her post-conviction claims,
was not that of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Because
Kolestani failed to demonstrate any excusable neglect entitling her to relief under I.R.C.P.
60(b)(1), she has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying
her motion.
Even if Kolestani could meet her threshold burden of showing excusable neglect,
the allegations in her motion were still not sufficient to entitle her to relief under Rule
60(b)(1). As previously noted, in addition to meeting the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b),
a party seeking relief from a final judgment or order must also “show, plead or present
evidence of facts which, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the
action.” Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317, 870 P.2d at 670. A review of
Kolestani’s motion shows she failed to do so.
Kolestani acknowledged in her motion for reconsideration that the district court
summarily dismissed her involuntary guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice claims
because the premise of those claims—that trial counsel advised Kolestani she would be
immediately deported if she did not plead guilty—was disproved by the record. (R.,
p.384.) However, rather than assailing that determination, Kolestani argued that the court
should reconsider its summary dismissal order because the immigration report attached to
the motion showed trial counsel was ineffective for having given Kolestani any
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immigration advice at all. (See R., p.384 (“According to the report, Petitioner faces the
real possibility of remaining in detention indefinitely because of the seriousness of [her]
crime.

This is a possibility not even disclosed or brought up to Petitioner.

The

immigration advise [sic], whatever advise [sic] that may have been, was wrong.” (internal
citation omitted).) Because Kolestani never alleged in her post-conviction petition that
her trial counsel was ineffective for giving her any immigration advice, the claim in her
motion for reconsideration that the immigration report showed counsel’s unspecified
advice was “wrong” was not a claim that, if established, would constitute a meritorious
defense to the court’s order dismissing Kolestani’s post-conviction claims. The district
court’s order denying Kolestani’s motion for reconsideration should thus be affirmed on
this basis. See Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317-18, 870 P.2d at 670-71 (“It
would be pointless to vacate a summary judgment and reopen the proceeding if the party
seeking relief has not shown that it can raise genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat the
summary judgment motion.”).
On appeal, Kolestani does not contend her motion for reconsideration presented
any meritorious grounds for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). (See generally Appellant’s
brief, pp.29-34.) Instead, she argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying the motion because it did so without explaining the basis for its decision.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.32-34.) Relying on Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,
332 P.3d 815 (2014), Kolestani contends the district court’s failure to set forth its
reasoning cannot be deemed harmless because the court’s silence leaves this Court
“without any basis to understand the district court’s denial of [Ms. Kolestani’s] motion.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.34 (quoting Agrisource, 156 Idaho at 914-15, 332 P.3d at 826-27).)
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Contrary to Kolestani’s assertions, however, Agrisource does not stand for the broad
proposition that a district court’s failure to set forth its reasons for denying an I.R.C.P.
60(b) motion can never be harmless error.
The district court in Agrisource failed to address why an affidavit submitted in
support of the Rule 60(b) motion at issue in that case did not meet Rule 60(b)’s
requirements. Agrisource, 156 Idaho at 914-15, 332 P.3d at 826-27. Agrisource argued
on appeal that any error in the court’s failure to set forth its reasoning was harmless
“because most of [the] affidavit was inadmissible.” Id. at 915, 332 P.3d at 827. The
Idaho Supreme Court rejected Agrisource’s harmless error argument, reasoning “[t]he
district court never ruled on admissibility, and therefore this Court will not rule on
admissibility.” Id.
Although the Supreme Court in Agrisource declined to find harmless error in the
trial court’s failure to explain the basis of its Rule 60(b) denial, it is clear that the Court
did so because the evidentiary issue underpinning Agrisource’s harmless error argument
was never decided by the district court. Id. The Court did not, however, indicate that a
trial court’s error in not explaining its reasons for denying a Rule 60(b) motion can never
be harmless error, nor did the Court expressly or impliedly overrule or disavow prior
cases holding such errors harmless. See, e.g., Leasefirst v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158, 163,
953 P.2d 598, 603 (1998) (holding harmless district court’s failure to specifically address
claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(5) where movants were not entitled to relief under that
rule); Tyler v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 528, 915 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Ct. App. 1996) (court’s
failure to address Rule 60(b)(6) claim harmless where facts asserted did not entitle
movant to relief under that rule).

In fact, since Agrisource was decided the Idaho
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Supreme Court has held a trial court’s failure to address the substance of a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion harmless where it was clear from the record that the motion was without merit.
See Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 157 Idaho 966, ___, 342 P.3d 893, 900 n.4 (2015).
Because, for the reasons articulated above, the allegations in Kolestani’s motion
for reconsideration failed on their face to entitle Kolestani to relief under Rule 60(b)(1),
the motion was without merit, and any error by the district court in failing to explain its
reasons for denying the motion should therefore be deemed harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and the district
court’s order denying Kolestani’s motion for reconsideration.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2018.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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